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1POTS, literally plain old telephone service, generally refers to services based on and around basic analog circuit-switched technologies.
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Abstract
Information systems analysts have typically focused on high technology, often overlooking low-technology
communications even though the core of social network load is still essentially low-tech. In this context, the
paper argues that while hi-tech offers efficiency gains at the individual level, many shortcomings prevent its
complete penetration at the social network level in organizations that operate in hostile environments, requiring
them to prioritize fault-tolerance above efficiency. Thus, such fault-intolerant network organizations optimize
hi-tech for the individual level and low-tech for the social network level. The general class of such
organizations is well represented among business and government structures; however, terrorist organizations
provide an especially fitting research case at this time of acute terrorist threats facing the world economy and
society at large. Hence, setting aside the prevailing preoccupation with hi-tech and attempting to understand
the underlying principles of the high- versus low-tech interplay, particularly as applied to these organizations,
is crucial in being able to detect terrorist communications and thwart their activities. Toward this goal, this
paper introduces a concept of fault-intolerant network organization (FINO) and develops an analytical
framework for addressing the research question of how such organizations use technology.
Keywords:  Fault-intolerant network organization, FINO, technology use, terrorist communications, reliability,
security, critical national infrastructure, privacy
between the general aims that we are fighting for,
and the immediate tasks of the moment,
 you will never know anything.
1984, George Orwell
1 CENTRAL ARGUMENT AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
While information systems analysts among researchers as well as practitioners have to a large degree focused on organizational
benefits of high-technology communications, their low-technology alternatives, such as human couriers, face-to-face meetings,
postal services and POTS1, have remained relatively overlooked, even though the core of social network load is still essentially
Drozdova/Fault-Intolerant Network Organizations
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1990s, partly because people prefer to work in physical social settings, and simple telephone usage still far outweighs the Internet (there are
about 163 telephone lines versus 18 computers connected to the Internet per 1,000 people worldwide; UNDP 2002).
712 2002  Twenty-Third International Conference on Information Systems
low-tech.2  Thus, while hi-tech communications offer efficiency gains at the individual level, their multiple shortcomings,
including security failures and economic costs, prevent total penetration at the social network level, e.g., within complex
organizations and society at large. This effect is particularly evident in network-type organizations that operate in hostile
environments and must, therefore, prioritize fault-tolerance above efficiency. Although substantial research has been devoted to
network organizations and their usage of advanced information and communications technologies (ICT), the fault-intolerant class
has been relatively understudied and its reliance on low-tech communications is poorly understood. Such lack of attention not
only constitutes a potential knowledge gap in an important area of information systems (IS) and organizational research, it may
also lead to increasingly perilous practical implications, since due to the intrinsically risky nature of their operations, such
organizations might be in position to cause considerable damage to the economy and societysome by accident, others on
purpose.
The primary characteristics of the fault-intolerant network organization (FINO) can be defined as:
1. Extremely hostile operating environment, including social pressure, geographical hazards, economic adversity,
and vast operational and developmental uncertainty
2. Overall strength and survivability of the network is generally defined by its weakest node
3. Node reliability and security must be pursued relentlessly to ensure the organizations survival and maximize
the likelihood of implementation of its objectives 
4. Resulting fault-tolerance requirements take precedence over efficiency and must be achieved at the expense
of efficiency if the two values conflict
The central research question is:  How do fault-intolerant network organizations use technology? 
Typically, IS research literature would suggest that optimal technology use would enable a fit between an organizations
information processing requirements and the capabilities of its structure (Tushman and Nadler 1978). This can be achieved by
creating self-contained tasks and slack resources, investing in vertical information systems, and enabling more lateral interactions,
i.e., by reducing the need for information processing and/or increasing processing capacity (Galbraith 1974). These approaches
broadly apply to FINOs but require a different strategic implementation since, for example, increased intra-organizational
interactions would introduce new vulnerabilities. Therefore, primary strategies for FINOs are to
 prioritize node reliability over efficiency 
 reduce the number of intra-organizational interactions through node isolation and self-sufficiency
 reduce the amount of information communicated to the need-to-know basis only
Accordingly, by drawing upon these organizational distinctions, a conjecture could be made regarding FINOs use of technology
to support such strategies.
FINO Conjecture:
Fault-intolerant network organizations use of technology is such that
 hi-tech is optimized for the individual level, while
 low-tech is optimized for the social network level. 
Thus, while on the individual level hi-tech can provide desirable efficiencies, at the network level, where strength of the network
is defined by its weakest node and nodes are sensitive to failure, fault-tolerance must take priority over efficiency. Therefore, for
their most sensitive, mission-critical communications, FINOs must choose time-tested low-tech methods,  with their minimal
infrastructure requirements and great robustness in the face of external hazards,  over sophisticated yet vulnerable hi-tech.
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communication around the world.
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Specifically, in this context low-tech could be defined as communications ranging from couriers and face-to-face meetings to
interactions enabled or enhanced by technology no more sophisticated than a conventional telephone.3  Alternatively, hi-tech refers
to the use of the more advanced technologies including computers, satellites and digital information systems. Social networks
are viewed as identifiable governance structures marked by complementary strengths and relational communications (Powell
1990). Furthermore, network organization is broadly conceptualized in terms of individual participants whose actions are
essentially embedded in social network interactions that affect organizational performance (Granovetter 1985; Uzzi 1996), with
the individual level defined primarily by skills and tasks involved in ones job, and the social network level defined in terms of
the entire occupational and organizational structure (Barley 1990). These definitions could also be generally extended to FINOs,
with the following specification:  the individual level pertains to the tactical non-relational tasks as well as limited relational
routine aspects that may be instrumental to, but not directly affecting, the network-level objectives and outcomes; and the social
network level refers to the strategic direction and mission-critical communications. However, IS literature presently provides only
limited insights for the understanding of technology usage by FINOs due to a common bias of typically referring to hi-tech when
theorizing on the organizational impact of technology. Attempting to rectify this growing hi-tech versus low-tech dichotomy,
which tends to overemphasize hi-tech in research and practice, is the central objective of this paper.
Evidence supporting this FINO conjecture is widespread.
1. The most obvious example, underscoring the general nature of the misconstrued hi-tech versus low-tech dichotomy as well
as its manifestation in FINO communications, is the largely low-tech nature of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon. Hijacking and using a plane as a weapon was chosen over multiple hi-tech options known
to be available to terrorists, from missiles to nuclear, chemical, biological, and cyber means. Furthermore, while the would-
be hijackers used e-mail to communicate with flight schools, their suspected leader, Mohamed Atta, and other key
conspirators traveled to Afghanistan in person to confer and strategize regarding the overall attack plans with their superiors
at higher organizational levels (Franz and Butler 2002). 
2. A deeper inquiry into what is known about the nature of Al Qaeda communications reveals, for example, that while the
network used to channel funds to its overseas operatives by setting up financial institutions and relying on the hi-tech global
financial system for relatively routine operations (e.g., Gunaratna 2002), since the United States retaliation for 9/11, it has
shifted most of its capital into gold and diamondsutilizing physical settlement and barter exchanges for the majority of
transactionsas well as toward greater reliance on direct, rather than financial, support from its sympathizers.
3. In the face of this threat, the U.S. government has responded by attempting to turn to the centuries-old neighborhood watch
intelligence gathering strategy of relying on informers, whose jobs involve circulating in local communities, to report
potentially suspicious activity along their routes (http://www.citizencorps.gov/tips.html).  Although this proposed program
has raised serious questions regarding privacy and civil liberties, its objectives emphasize that the means necessary to gather
information at the basic social level must inevitably match the nature of the prevailing threat, which is essentially low-tech.
4. In business, typically characterized as driven by efficiency considerations, reliability often takes precedence, especially with
regard to vital communications. In particular, it is indeed a standard practice to invite important clients to social outings and
seal major deals face-to-face, while the streets of New York business districtsthe CPU of the global financial system
are awash with bicycle-mounted messengers. Furthermore, national economies generally still tend to keep gold reserves as
a buffer against economic uncertainty. Even in such a proverbial hi-tech arena as computer technology, most cutting edge
components now tend to be initially released for the individual user market, with government and corporate networks
generally relying on older, but better-tested releases (amply demonstrated by, for example, the server market), particularly
for their mission-critical applications.
These examples underscore that FINOs exist in various socio-political sectors including government and business. A prime
member of this class is the terrorist organization, poor understanding of which, in the face of the danger to society that it presents,
makes it warrant a dedicated in-depth study. 
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2 RESEARCH PROBLEM:  TERRORIST CASE BACKGROUND
Overall, terrorist organizations appear to fit the FINO definition on all accounts. Due to their fundamentally unlawful and
subversive goals, they operate in extreme, socially marginalized environments. Their leadership and operating facilities are thus
rendered to rugged geographical terrains and/or areas of low economic as well as technological development. They have to stay
clandestine to survive as nation-states and international authorities continuously attempt to monitor, uncover, and thwart their
activities and ultimately destroy them. To counteract this pressure, sophisticated groups such as Al Qaeda spread the risk, e.g.,
by using a loosely coupled worldwide cell structure. Nevertheless, they are still highly sensitive to cell (network node) failure,
for once counterterrorist authorities compromise a cell, they can, at least in principle, penetrate and unravel the entire network.
Thus, for terrorist organizations fault-tolerance must take priority over efficiency, causing them to generally choose the reliable
low-tech methods over more efficient hi-tech ones for the majority of their substantive network-level communications. 
If we were to ask a question, How could the lengthy and elaborate planning in preparation for the spectacular terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001, go on undetected, all our sophisticated global information interception, sharing and analysis technologies
notwithstanding?, a basic interpretation might be that a nation that values life and personal liberty, as well as commands the most
advanced military in the world, simply did not expect that humans, including its own civiliansand not some complicated war
machinerywould be used to attack its homeland from its own friendly skies. Such a miscalculation serves to highlight a basic
discrepancy in the world-views of adversaries in the war on terrorism, which is enhanced by the globalization trends reinforcing
their separation along the spectrum of economic, political, and technological issues. Attackers frequently originate from areas that
are at the low end of that spectrum. They believe that they know all they need to about the West and tend to blame it for their
misfortunes as well as to advocate violence against the perceived source of their oppression. At the opposite end of the spectrum
are the defenders of the prosperous and relatively open West, which could be characterized as having the most in the way of
resources (and, therefore, the most to lose), while possessing little animosity toward but also little interest and understanding of
their opponents. 9/11 has not only underscored this need for better understanding our opponents, it has also brought about a
forthright recognition by the researchers as well as government officials and business leaders that a much higher than previously
acknowledged level of threats comes from well-organized global terrorist networks, whose prime target is the United States and
its global economy per se, not just individual businesses and branches of government.
It has long been suspected that terrorist networks may have access to advanced communications means. In fact, the ascendance
of the Internet has been repeatedly blamed for putting advanced encoding and explosive technologies in every pair of willing
hands. In response, legislators, law enforcement and intelligence agencies have worked on a strategy to expand their investigative
capabilities and surveillance infrastructures by utilizing the latest scientific breakthroughs while attempting to relax civil liberty
protections that may constrain their usage. Although such efforts were evidently insufficient to detect the September 11 plot and
the (un)related anthrax mailing campaign, they have nevertheless been further stepped up since the 9/11 attacks (e.g., the USA
Patriot Act).  Meanwhile, the issue of the overall relevance of hi-tech communications has not been thoroughly addressed,
potentially at the expense of other means.
In light of all these developments, the question of detecting and dealing with low-tech terrorist communications has received far
less attention in our hi-tech age than seems warranted by their use. While hi-tech tactics may seem more appropriate, or at least
more probable, in todays information age, terrorists are still relying on low-tech communications and perhaps more so in response
to the presence of increasingly hi-tech detection measures. For example, Osama bin Laden has reportedly stopped using satellite
or cell phones once his communications were traced (and after a former Chechen leader was killed having been located through
his use of a satellite phone) and has subsequently vanished.  The issue is that detecting low- and lower-tech communications can
be much more difficult and costly than tracking the advanced digital information, which can be collected, computed, and
processed automatically. Searching people and letters is resource demanding (hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent on
airport security and reequipping the postal system since September, 2001), essentially inefficient (explosives and bio-active agents
are still getting through, while the sender of anthrax letters is yet to be found), harmful to the operations of critical national
infrastructure segments (air travel services have been severely undermined by the direct and indirect costs of new regulations with
the majority of United States airlines filing for or teetering on the verge of bankruptcy), and highly questionable from the
perspective of human rights (e.g., privacy). Most importantly, low-tech communications can be used and have been demonstrated
to be very effective in delivering high-impact payloads, including anthrax in letters and explosives tied to human bodies (which
have been used to kill thousands of people, particularly in the Middle East and Sri Lankan conflicts, including Indias Prime
Minister Rajiv Ghandi). Thus, the relative lack of attention toward such less sophisticated methods could potentially lead to
an oversight of major attacks in the making, which, as 9/11 has aptly demonstrated, threaten not only the lives of individuals, but
also the very economic and social underpinnings of the society.
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3 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Based on the terrorist network case background including known communication patterns of sophisticated terrorist organizations
such as Al Qaeda, one can devise a general analytical framework for studying the technology use by fault-intolerant network
organizations. Figure 1 presents such a framework developed by combining the technological and organizational dimensions
defined above, specifying organizational objectives and pertinent technologies in use at each level, and articulating the reasons
underlying the resulting conjectures.
Primary Organizational Level
Technology Level
Individual
Objectives:
tactical goals,
routine activities
Social Network
Objectives:
strategic goals,
mission-critical activities
Hi-Tech
Scope:
Internet/E-mail, video,
wireless/satellite phones, 
global banking system,
modern hi-tech weaponry
WHEN POSSIBLE
PRO
 efficiency gains
 practical anonymity
 enhanced flexibility
CON
 higher access/use costs
WHEN UNAVOIDABLE
PRO
 efficiency gains
CON
 electronic detection/analysis
 infrastructure/maintenance costs 
 lowered robustness 
Low-Tech
Scope:
couriers, contacts,
face-to-face meetings, 
postal service, POTS, 
barter/physical exchange,
basic-to-crude weaponry
WHEN NECESSARY
PRO
 cost-effectiveness
 increased robustness
 lower/no training requirements
 easy access
CON
 low efficiency/processing capacity
WHEN POSSIBLE
PRO
 minimal infrastructure requirements
 robustness against external hazards 
 greater node reliability
 enhanced overall fault-tolerance 
CON
 reduced operational efficiency 
Figure 1.  Technology Use by Fault-Intolerant Network Organizations
4 RESEARCH METHOD
The method thus far has been essentially conceptual, aimed at articulating the underlying principles and developing the analytical
categories and the framework to address the research question. Further steps will involve a systematic empirical investigation,
including identifying several FINOs, gathering data on their use of technology, analyzing the data according to the framework,
and testing the central conjecture propositions. Organizations may be considered from business, government, and military sectors
as well as terrorist groups. Overall, the ability to generalize from the initial terrorist case to other organizations within the class,
such as intelligence services and some mission-critical business units, is broadly reinforced not only by the close fit of the case
with the theorized parameters of the class, but also because such organizations typically rely on similar time-tested clandestine
strategies and sometimes even on each other in developing their secure communications techniques. For example, many large
businesses tend to hire former government security personnel to protect critical assets by leveraging their particular skills and
organizational contacts. At the other end of the spectrum, Al Qaeda is known to have used various governments intelligence
services manuals as well as collaborated with other subversive groups, such as Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines.
5 CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
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Drawing upon the case of terrorist communications, this study develops conceptual foundations for analyzing the broader class
of fault-intolerant network organizations (FINOs) and argues that they use technology to optimize hi-tech for the individual level
and low-tech for the social network level. These foundations provide a departure point for theory-building, a coherent framework
for empirical study of such organizations in various sectors including business and government, and a consistent analytical
approach to understanding and dealing with predominantly low-tech terrorist communications in the hi-tech age. This, in turn,
should contribute to better understanding of an important class of network organizations, which has so far remained relatively
overlooked, in particular furthering the goals of generally impeding the activity of terrorist network organizations, regardless of
communication means they choose to employ.
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